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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN, : Case No. 20000113-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
On appeal, Mr. William Reigenborn is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to 
continue the jury trial. Mr. Reigenborn maintains that the trial court's denial of a continuance 
deprived him of his constitutional right to due process, denied him his sixth amendment right to 
counsel, his constitutional right to compulsory process and his constitutional right to counsel of 
his choosing. 
In response to Mr. Reigenborn's arguments on appeal, the state claims the following: 
With respect to the denial of a continuance, the state asserts that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Mr. Reigenborn's motion to continue since the denial did not materially 
prejudice Mr. Reigenborn and the result of the trial would not have been different had the 
continuance been granted. 
With respect to Mr. Reigenborn's claim that he was denied counsel of his choosing, the 
state maintains that because Mr. Reigenborn was indigent, he was not entitled to counsel of his 
own choosing. 
With respect to Mr. Reigenborn's assertion that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, the state argues that the trial court's failure to inquire into Mr. Reigenbom's 
complaints regarding appointed counsel does not constitute reversible error and in any event, Mr. 
Reigenbom was provided effective assistance of counsel at trial. 
With regard to Mr. Reigenbom's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw, the state claims that because Mr. Reigenbom did 
not hire private counsel, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining appointed counsel's 
request to withdraw. 
Finally, with regard to Mr. Reigenbom's assertion that he was denied his constitutional 
right to compulsory process, the state argues that Mr. Reigenbom failed to present evidence that 
the testimony of absent witnesses would have altered the outcome of the trial and therefore, his 
right to compulsory process was not violated. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S DENIAL OF A 
CONTINUANCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS 
UNPERSUASIVE BECAUSE MR. REIGENBORN WAS MATERIALLY 
PREJUDICED BY THE DENIAL 
In determining whether the trial court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, the following factors must be considered: 
[1] whether other continuances have been requested and granted; [2] the balanced 
convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; 
[3] whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, 
purposeful, or contrived; [4] whether the defendant contributed to the 
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance;... [and 5] 
whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to 
defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial 
nature. 
United States v. Burton. 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (quoted with approval in Lavton 
City v. Longcrier. 946 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997)). In order to demonstrate a clear abuse of 
discretion, the moving party must demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced by the court's 
denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the continuance 
been granted." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474,476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Barker. 35 
Wash.App. 3888, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (1983)). 
A. PRIOR CONTINUANCES 
The state asserts that on May 20,1999, defense counsel requested a trial continuance. 
(Resp. Brief pp. 2, 5.) However, this assertion is not supported by the record. As is often true, 
multiple cases are set for jury trial on one day. The case which is highest in priority bumps other 
cases from the trial calendar. For example, cases where an accused is in-custody take precedence 
over those cases where the accused is out of custody. If there are no in-custody cases, then the 
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trial court will prioritize cases by the date of the alleged offense or the filing of the information. 
If defense counsel has had no contact with a client whose case has highest priority, a jury 
generally will not be called in unless there is a case of lesser priority which, based on the 
representations of defense counsel and the state, will be proceeding to jury trial. 
There is nothing in the May 20, 1999, transcript to indicate that Mr. Reigenbom's case 
should have moved forward that day. Mr. Reigenbom was not in custody and there is no 
indication from the court that Mr. Reigenbom's trial actually would have proceeded that day. It 
is likely that either a jury was called in to hear a different matter that day which was higher in 
priority than Mr. Reigenbom's case or that no jury was called in at all. So, in fact, there is 
nothing in the record to demonstrate that Mr. Reigenbom requested and was granted a 
continuance. Moreover, the transcript from May 20,1999, entitles the hearing as a "pretrial 
conference." (Pretrial Conference Tr. p.l.) 
The record does prove, however, that the court continued one jury trial setting (R. 20) and 
the state continued another. (R. 25-30.) Certainly Mr. Reigenbom cannot be held responsible 
for either the court's or the state's continuance and such continuances should not have been held 
against Mr. Reigenbom when the court denied Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance. 
B. BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
The trial court made no attempt to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of Mr. 
Reigenbom, the state's witnesses, the attorneys or the court, in denying Mr. Reigenbom's motion 
to continue. The state asserts that because the court informed Mr. Reigenbom that it did not wish 
to continue the trial merely based on speculation that Mr. Reigenbom would be hiring private 
counsel, such assertion constituted a balancing of interests. (Brief of Respondent p. 11.) Such a 
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statement by the trial court does not meet the court's obligation to balance the necessary interests 
in determining whether a continuance is appropriate. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
inconvenience to the witnesses, attorneys or the court, beyond that which was imposed by the 
court's continuance and the state's continuance of the matter on prior occasions. 
C. REASON FOR REQUESTED DELAY 
The State contends that Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance for the purpose of 
hiring counsel is not legitimate because the court had previously informed Mr. Reigenborn that 
the trial would go forward, regardless of whether private counsel had been retained. (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 11.) The state further argues that Mr. Reigenbom's request for a continuance was 
nothing more than an attempt to delay the proceedings. 
Mr. Reigenborn informed the trial court of his desire to hire private counsel but also 
informed the court that due to his work schedule, he was having a difficult time setting up a 
meeting with the attorney he wished to hire. Mr. Reigenborn did not request a continuance in 
order to meet with appointed counsel because he did not desire the assistance of appointed 
counsel; he requested a continuance solely for the purpose of hiring private counsel to defend 
him on the Assault charge. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. 
Reigenborn sought to delay the trial in this matter merely for the purpose of delay. Mr. 
Reigenborn expressed a legitimate reason for needing a continuance. Moreover, given the 
mental health issues involved in this matter, it is not entirely clear that Mr. Reigenborn 
understood the urgency of hiring private counsel and moving the case forward at a more rapid 
pace. 
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D. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE 
The state argues that because Mr. Reigenbom failed to contact defense counsel, he 
contributed to the circumstances which precipitated the continuance request and for that reason, 
the trial court properly denied Mr. Reigenbom's and defense counsel's motion to continue. 
While it is true that Mr. Reigenbom's contacts with counsel were limited to their meetings on 
scheduled court dates, it is also true that Mr. Reigenbom did not have any intention of 
proceeding to trial with appointed counsel defending his case. Given this circumstance and Mr. 
Reigenbom's clear desire to proceed to trial with counsel other than court-appointed counsel, 
certainly it would not be reasonable to expect Mr. Reigenbom to attempt contact with appointed 
counsel beyond the contact necessitated by specified court dates. 
E. MATERIAL PREJUDICE 
i. MR. REIGENBORN WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR A 
CONTINUANCE BECAUSE IT RESULTED IN THE DENIAL 
OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOOSING 
Mr. Reigenbom was entitled to counsel of his choosing and was denied his constitutional 
right to counsel when the trial court denied his motion to continue. The court's denial of Mr. 
Reigenbom's motion to continue deprived Mr. Reigenbom of both the opportunity and option of 
hiring counsel of his choosing although Mr. Reigenbom had both the ability and the means to do 
so. 
When Mr. Reigenbom was initially brought before the court on the assault charge in the 
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instant matter, he was unemployed and therefore indigent.1 However, at the time Mr. 
Reigenbom expressed his desire to retain private counsel, he was no longer indigent. (PTC Tr. 2; 
J.T. Tr. 4.) In fact, Mr. Reigenbom was driving a long-haul truck and earning an income 
sufficient to permit him to hire private counsel. (J.T. Tr. 4.) 
In response to Mr. Reigenbom's argument that he was denied counsel of his choosing, the 
state appears to claim that because Mr. Reigenbom was indigent he was not entitled to his choice 
of counsel. (See Brief of Appellant.) While it is true that an accused who is indigent is entitled 
only to counsel as appointed by the court, an accused who is able to employ counsel has the right 
to representation by an attorney of his or her choice. State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120,121 
(Utah 1986); Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). 
Here, Mr. Reigenbom expressed both his desire and ability to retain private counsel. 
Because Mr. Reigenbom was not longer indigent at the time he expressed a desire to retain 
private counsel of his own choosing, he was entitled to his choice of counsel. The right to 
counsel of one's choosing is a component of an individual's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
and thus is of constitutional dimension. Id Certainly the denial of a constitutional right 
constitutes material prejudice. Cf Utah R. Crim. P. 30 (a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.") Thus, the 
trial court's failure to grant Mr. Reigenbom a continuance to retain counsel of his choosing 
constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in material prejudice to Mr. Reigenbom. 
1
 At the time of sentencing and the filing of this appeal, Mr. Reigenbom was unemployed 
and indigent. 
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ii. THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT MR. REIGENBORN'S CONDUCT 
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM INQUIRING INTO MR. 
REIGENBORN'S COMPLAINTS CONCERNING COUNSEL 
BOLSTERS MR. REIGENBORN'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS 
DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL BY THE 
COURT'S DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, when a defendant alleges lack of 
preparation by defense counsel as a basis for requesting a continuance, "[d]enying a continuance 
may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." State v. 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993). 
[W]hen a complaint is registered by a criminal defendant concerning his or her 
appointed counsel, the court must balance the potential for last minute delay and 
the propensity for manipulation of the system against the competing concern 
about the likely inability of indigent defendants to articulate and communicate 
their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersons find quite intimidating. 
State v. PursifelL 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987). When such dissatisfaction is expressed, 
the trial court must employ 
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's 
complaints and to apprise [sic] itself of the facts necessary to determine whether 
the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for 
substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are 
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and delay the 
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. 
14 (citing United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185,187 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
Mr. Reigenborn clearly expressed his concerns regarding court-appointed counsel to the 
trial court. With respect to this concern, the following colloquy took place between the trial 
court and Mr. Reigenborn: 
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me. 
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THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - -
MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on 
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing 
without no witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent 
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - -
MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for 
me - -
THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm 
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be. 
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent 
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If--
if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll 
proceed in the trial without your presence. 
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) 
The state claims that Mr. Reigenbom's own behavior caused the trial court's lack of 
inquiry and therefore Mr. Reigenborn was not denied counsel and the lack of inquiry does not 
constitute reversible error. However, Mr. Reigenbom's behavior should have signaled to the trial 
court that Mr. Reigenbom harbored serious concerns about appointed counsel's representation 
and that Mr. Reigenbom may be suffering from a mental defect or illness. 
There is nothing in this Court's opinion in Pursifell to support the state's claim that the 
trial court may be relieved of its inquiry obligation if a defendant exhibits behavior which the 
State deems "inappropriate". Here, the trial court did not engage Mr. Reigenbom in the type of 
questioning designed to get to the heart of his complaints with respect to counsel and the state 
even concedes that such an inquiry was not conducted. (See Brief of Respondent p. 15: "In Mr. 
Reigenbom's case, the trial court's lack of inquiry was not reversible error."). Thus, the state's 
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argument hinges on its claim that the court's failure to inquire did not constitute reversible error. 
The state argues that "Ms. Sisneros [sic] inability to contact witnesses or failure to 
subpoena witnesses does not indicate a lack of preparation." (Brief of Respondent p. 15.) Mr. 
Reigenborn has not asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, but is claiming that he was denied 
counsel both because of the deterioration of his limited relationship with defense counsel and the 
lack of communication between himself and defense counsel which led to a lack of investigation 
and preparation for the trial of Mr. Reigenbom's case.2 
The state has failed to identify any inquiry by the trial court that would even remotely 
qualify as adequate under Pursifell and has instead twisted Mr. Reigenbom's argument into one 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which has never been Mr. Reigenbom's claim. There is 
simply nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court made any attempt to inquire into Mr. 
Reigenbom's relationship with defense counsel and whether such relationship had deteriorated to 
the point that Mr. Reigenborn had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Clearly 
the relationship between defense counsel and Mr. Reigenborn had deteriorated to an extent that, 
at a minimum, the trial court should have inquired into Mr. Reigenbom's complaints. The 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error because it resulted in the denial of Mr. Reigenbom's 
Sixth Amendment Right to counsel. 
2
 Notably, all contact between Mr. Reigenborn and defense counsel was limited to their 
meetings on scheduled court dates. There was never a face-to-face office meeting between the 
two and all information defense counsel obtained about Mr. Reigenbom's case, including 
possible witnesses, was limited to conversations she had with Mr. Reigenborn on the set court 
dates. As previously explained, Mr. Reigenborn intended to hire private counsel. 
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iii. MR. REIGENBORN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT MS. SNIPES' 
MOTHER WOULD HAVE PROVIDED MATERIAL AND RELEVANT 
TESTIMONY THAT WAS VITAL TO HIS DEFENSE OF 
DIMINISHED CAPACITY 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Mr. Reigenbom would have called Ms. 
Snipes' mother both to undermine Ms. Snipes' credibility and to demonstrate a pattern of 
harassment and provocation by Ms. Snipes of Mr. Reigenbom, information that would have 
bolstered Mr. Reigenbom's defense of diminished mental capacity and the inability to form the 
specific intent required for the offense of assault. 
The state seems to claim that in order to demonstrate the denial of compulsory process, 
Mr. Reigenbom must show that his witness would have provided material testimony that would 
changed the outcome of the trial. Moreover, the state apparently claims that because Mr. 
Reigenbom knew of his trial date, he had sufficient time to contact witnesses to testify on his 
behalf sans counsel. 
In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to compulsory process, a 
defendant must make some plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness "would 
have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274 
(Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 
3449, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1193 (1982) (footnote omitted)). Testimony is deemed material and its 
exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the 
outcome of the trial." Id. 
Mr. Reigenbom has already demonstrated how the testimony of Ms. Snipes' mother 
would undermine Ms. Snipes' credibility and bolster Mr. Reigenbom's defense of diminished 
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capacity. Such a defense would certainly call into question Mr. Reigenbom's ability to form the 
specific intent required for the jury to find him guilty of assault. Accordingly, the testimony of 
Ms. Snipes' mother was material, relevant and would have affected the outcome of the trial in 
that it would have negated Mr. Reigenbom's intent, an essential element of assault, a specific 
intent offense. 
Moreover, although Mr. Reigenbom would personally have subpoena authority if he were 
representing himself, he does not possess such authority when he is represented by counsel. See 
Utah R. Crim. Proc. Rule 14 (a). Such authority is vested in defense counsel and is utilized at 
counsel's discretion. The state cannot seriously expect an accused who is represented by 
counsel to conduct his or her own investigation on a case, particularly where the accused 
anticipates relieving appointed counsel of his or her duties by retaining private counsel. 
II. THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE PRIVATE 
COUNSEL HAD NOT ENTERED AN APPEARANCE FAILS TO TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
APPOINTED COUNSEL AND MR. REIGENBORN 
The state asserts that because private counsel never entered an appearance, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying appointed counsel's motion to withdraw from 
representation of Mr. Reigenbom. The state also claims that any deterioration in the attorney-
client relationship is the fault of Mr. Reigenbom for failing to contact appointed counsel and that 
he lacked good cause for failing to cooperate with counsel. 
A trial court's grant or denial of counsel's motion to withdraw in a criminal case is 
discretionary and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 
(Utah App. 1997); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(1)(B) ("A motion to withdraw as an attorney 
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in a criminal case shall be made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise 
ordered by the court."). 
Defense counsel informed the trial court of Mr. Reigenbom's desire to retain private 
counsel and the court heard directly from Mr. Reigenbom with regard to his complaints about 
defense counsel. Mr. Reigenbom expressed the following concerns to the court: 
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - -
MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on 
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing 
without no witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent 
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - -
MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for 
me - -
THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm 
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be. 
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent 
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If - -
if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll 
proceed in the trial without your presence. 
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) This exchange demonstrates Mr. Reigenbom's concerns about being represented 
by appointed counsel. Clearly, from Mr. Reigenbom's perspective, the attorney-client 
relationship had deteriorated to the point where Mr. Reigenbom did not believe counsel could or 
would adequately represent his interests. 
Moreover, the state's reliance on State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 383 (Utah App. 1997) is 
misplaced. Scales involved an instance where the defendant was represented by court-appointed 
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counsel and the defendant had argued that his relationship with court-appointed counsel had 
deteriorated to the extent that the attorney-client relationship had been compromised. The 
defendant sought appointment of new counsel due to the deterioration of his relationship with his 
then appointed counsel. Appointed counsel moved to withdraw from representation of the 
defendant but the trial court denied the motion because the defendant had failed to demonstrate 
good cause for declining to cooperate with appointed counsel. This Court upheld the trial court's 
decision, concluding that the relationship between appointed counsel and the defendant had 
deteriorated because of the defendant's failure to cooperate. This Court further found that the 
defendant lacked good cause for refusing to cooperate with appointed counsel. 
It appears that the good cause standard set forth in Scales applies only to those instances 
where a defendant seeks to have appointed counsel replaced by other appointed counsel, not to 
instances where a defendant seeks to have court-appointed counsel replaced by private counsel. 
As previously noted, an indigent accused is entitled to counsel, but not necessarily to his or her 
choice of counsel; however, an accused who retains private counsel is entitled to his or her 
choice of counsel. Because an accused who retains private counsel is entitled to his or choice of 
counsel, the accused need not demonstrate good cause in order to replace one private attorney 
with another; the court simply does not become involved in the decision of an accused to hire or 
fire his or her private counsel. However, where the accused is indigent and counsel is appointed, 
the accused is not entitled to his or her choice of counsel and the court must find conflict between 
an indigent accused and appointed counsel (good cause) before appointing new counsel. 
Here, defense counsel and Mr. Reigenborn were not asking the trial court to appoint new 
counsel, they were merely requesting a continuance so that Mr. Reigenborn could retain private 
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counsel. The minimal relationship established between defense counsel and Mr. Reigenbom had 
deteriorated to the extent that Mr. Reigenbom desired to hire private counsel to represent his 
interests. Because Mr. Reigenbom was not indigent at the time he sought private counsel, he 
was entitled to counsel of his choosing and the trial court abused its discretion in declining to 
grant a continuance so that Mr. Reigenbom could obtain private counsel. See supra argument 
I.E.i. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant William Keith Reigenborn respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ^ - d a y of September, 2000. 
1 ; .> 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
- Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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